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 Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and other critics have argued that liberalism 
is living off the borrowed capital of Western civilization.1  That is, to the extent that 
liberalism requires neutrality among theories of the good, the generation of values – of 
strong families, hard workers, honest people, engaged citizens, and devout church 
members – takes place offstage.  These critics worry that the institutions producing such 
values, e.g., churches and families, have atrophied in the modern secular state, and 
liberalism could no longer assume that private institutions would serve the purposes that, 
before the rise of liberalism, had been seen as the province of the state.2
 William Galston responded to this critique by arguing that liberalism does not 
require neutrality toward the creation of values central to liberalism itself.3  A liberal 
democratic state should be able to foster “liberal virtues” such as tolerance, industry, 
honesty, family stability and civic engagement.  Indeed, historically, liberal states have 
strongly regulated sexual morality, family stability and educational quantity and content. 
 The issue then arises, however, how a liberal state promotes such values in the 
absence of consensus not just on the values themselves, but on the institutions necessary 
to inculcate them.  The United States today, for example, deals with differences in 
educational philosophies by allowing parents and students to choose among public or 
private schools, established schools or home schooling.4  The relationship between 
church and state similarly involves a long and tortured effort to balance free expression, 
which necessarily requires a measure of autonomy in creating religious institutions, and 
the establishment clause, which mandates state neutrality among the institutions created. 
 Some issues, however, require that the state choose.  Traffic regulation is an easy 
example; drivers cannot construct rival roadways some of which mandate driving on the 
left and others on the right.  The choice of a democracy over a monarchy provides 
                                                 
1 See Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (2d ed. 1984); Michael J. Sandel, Introduction, in Michael J. Sandel, 
ed, Liberalism and Its Critics 5 (NYU, 1984), Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent 7-8 (1996).  For 
a summary of this debate within family law, see Jennifer Wriggins Marriage Law and Family Law: 
Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender 41 B.C. L. Rev 265, 265-
67(2000)(summarizing discussion including Bruce Hafen, Carl Schneider, and Mary Ann Glendon, about 
the law’s expressive function and the communitarian critique of individualism).  See also William A. 
Error! Main Document Only.Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state, 
304  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) ("In the past generation, thinkers along the political 
spectrum from Irving Kristol to Jurgen Habermas have contended that liberalism is dependent on -- and has 
depleted -- the accumulated moral capital of revealed religion and premodern moral philosophy.") Error! 
Main Document Only.. 
2 See, e.g., Reynolds v. the United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879)(noting that the colonies sometimes 
required church attendance and used tax dollars to support established churches). 
3 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State 220-21 (1991).  
See also Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal 
Constitutionalism 200 (1990). 
4 Indeed, the United States has enjoyed a healthy debate both on the most effective form of educational 
institutions (comprehensive public schools versus niche designed charter schools, vouchers to subsidize 
public schools, etc.) and the extent of state power to compel attendance.  See, e.g., Yoder v.   
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another illustration.  A state may recognize an individual’s right to express a preference 
for a monarchy over a democracy without giving the individual a right to be governed by 
a monarchy or to opt out of the requirements of democratic governance.  In these cases, 
the autonomy of the individual to choose one institution over another is necessarily 
limited.   
 The question that is emerging today is whether state regulation of the family is 
such an area.  Historically, the idea of autonomy with respect to the creation of family 
form would have been considered an oxymoron to the extent that the issue arose at all.  
The traditional family of biological mother, father and child was often treated as prior to 
the state,5 if not foundational to society itself.6  The Supreme Court has recognized 
marriage as “an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply 
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would 
be neither civilization nor progress.”7   Nor has the state been neutral among the possible 
forms of marriage.  When the Supreme Court confronted the issue of polygamy as an 
expression of Mormon religious practice in the Utah territories during the nineteenth 
century, it had no trouble declaring "the organization of a community for the spread and 
practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of 
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western 
world."8
 The basis for these decisions, for the denial of autonomy with respect to the 
choice of institutions, and not just individual behavior, bears revisiting.   As an initial 
matter, the Supreme Court has distinguished between belief and practice.  The First 
Amendment protects the former, but not necessarily the latter.9  That distinction holds 
today, especially with respect to a practice that is permitted, but not compelled, by one’s 
religion.10   Second, in determining whether the state could regulate practice, the Court 
has considered the existence of consensus, consensus based on factors that shift over 
time.  In the nineteenth century, for example, the Court explicitly acknowledged the 
United States’s legacy as a nation of European immigrants, stating bluntly that 
“[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, 
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Peachey, Paul, ed.: Private and Public Social Inventions in Modern Societies, also ed. by Leon 
Dyczewski and John Kromkowski (HTML at crvp.org) (“Conventionally we view the family as prior to the 
society, both genetically and historically; genetically, because the family provides the human material from 
which the state and other social formations are constructed; historically, because as we well know the 
family precedes the state.”) http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-2/chapter_iv.htm 
6 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding marriage "fundamental to our very existence 
and survival"). 
7 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-211 (1888). 
8 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890). 
9 Reynolds, supra, at 166, observing that: 
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be 
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a 
sacrifice?  Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of 
her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying 
her belief into practice? 
10 See, e.g., the more recent cases holding that a landlord cannot refuse to rent to unmarried intimate 
partners whose behavior violates her religious beliefs because nothing in those religious beliefs requires her 
to be in the business of renting apartments.  Smith v.   
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the life of Asiatic and of African people.”11  More fundamentally, however, the Court 
went on to examine the basis for the preference of monogamy over polygamy.  It 
concluded that: 
Upon . . . [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring 
social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is 
necessarily required to deal.  In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous 
marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the 
people, to a greater or less extent, rests.  Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to 
the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters 
the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in 
connection with monogamy.12  
The state could accordingly choose one institution (monogamy) over another (polygamy) 
where that choice reflected both the consensus views of the populace and the promotion 
of values (liberty and equality over despotism) consistent with a democracy.  
 This reasoning leaves open the obligation of the state over the choice of basic 
institutions where these conditions do not hold.  What if, on questions basic to the 
organization of family, no consensus exists?  What if different demographic and 
economic circumstances create different family traditions among different states?  What 
if fundamentally different values in different parts of the country produce polarization 
rather than agreement on the family values appropriate for a liberal democracy?  Does the 
state obligation to recognize autonomy in the selection of family form change? 
 This paper will address these issues by, first, examining the debate about the 
regulation of morality and distinguishing the control of individual behavior from the 
selection of basic institutions.  Second, it will examine the polarization now taking place 
on the definition of family values among the states and argue that these differences reflect 
different challenges produced by the nature of the interaction among marriage, 
childbearing and the adult life cycle.  Third, it will maintain that these differences, while 
the product of different approaches to family institutions consistent with historic efforts at 
secular family regulation, interact with religious as well as secular beliefs.  Finally, the 
paper will consider what some measure of autonomy and respect for others might entail 
in a system in which different states adopt fundamentally different approaches toward the 
definition and regulation of family values.   
 The paper will conclude that in an era of polarization the state cannot remain 
neutral in the choice of basic values, and it should be able to choose, on a majoritarian 
basis, to promote one set of values over another.  Autonomy in the constitution of family 
as a state-sanctioned status thus becomes impossible.  In these circumstances, the 
obligation of a liberal state then becomes one of minimizing the “moral affront” to the 
                                                 
11 Reynolds, supra, at 164. 
12 Id. at 165-66 (citations omitted).  The Court stated further: “An exceptional colony of polygamists under 
an exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without appearing to disturb the social condition 
of the people who surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of 
constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether 
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion.”  Id. at 166. 
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views of the rejected minority, and preserving individual autonomy in the expression of 
contrary views or private conduct.    
I. The Regulation of Sexual Morality 
 
The regulation of individual behavior is distinct from the regulation of 
institutions.   Nonetheless, the two are related and even in liberal states committed to 
individual autonomy, some regulation of sexual morality has been the norm.   The 
question of whether that regulation can be reconciled with individual liberty has 
generated centuries of discussion.13  Perhaps the classic debate within the Anglo-
American tradition occurred between Patrick Devlin and H. L. A. Hart in the fifties.  A 
British Parliamentary Committee had proposed deregulating sexual behavior between 
consenting adults, and repealing the laws that criminalized, among other things, 
homosexuality and prostitution.  Lord Devlin opposed the liberalization on two grounds.  
He argued, first, that every society has the right to conserve its own traditions, to preserve 
the practices that are distinctive to its culture,14 and, second, that a society must preserve 
its fundamental morality in order not to disintegrate.15
 Devlin would judge a society’s fundamental morality in terms of those acts that a 
jury of representative citizens would find offensive.  Michael McConnell defends this 
deference to a communal or consensus based moral view in terms not so different from 
the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century deference to “Western civilization.”  He argues 
that: 
An individual has only his own, necessarily limited, intelligence and experience 
(personal and vicarious) to draw upon. Tradition, by contrast, is composed of the 
cumulative thoughts and experiences of thousands of individuals over an expanse 
of time, each of them making incremental and experimental alterations (often 
unconsciously), which are then adopted or rejected (again, often unconsciously) 
on the basis of experience -- the experience, that is, of whether they advance the 
good life.16
H.L. A. Hart responded to Devlin (and implicitly to McConnell’s identification of 
the source of Devlin’s morality) by questioning whether any notion of morality can be 
determined with certainty, and whether change over time could be said to produce the 
“disintegration” of society.  He observed that Devlin’s argument moved “from the 
acceptable proposition that some shared morality is essential to the existence of any 
society to the unacceptable proposition that a society is identical with its morality as that 
is at any given moment of its history, so that a change in its morality is tantamount to the 
destruction of a society,” and called the latter proposition “absurd.”17
                                                 
13 Some would date the Anglo-American discussion to John Stuart Mill, On Liberty.  See  Robert C.L. 
Moffat, Commentary: "Not The Law's Business:"  The Politics Of Tolerance And The Enforcement Of 
Morality, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (2005), 
14 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 11 (1972). 
15 Id. at at 10 ("[W]ithout shared ideas on politics, morals, and ethics no society can exist . . . . If men and 
women try to create a society in which there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil they will 
fail; . . . the society will disintegrate.") 
16 Robin West, Progressive And Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 641, 654-55 (1990).  
17 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 51,52 (1963).  He continued: “Taken strictly, it would prevent 
us saying that the morality of a given society had changed, and would compel us instead to say that one 
society had disappeared and another one taken its place. But it is only on this absurd criterion of what it is 
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As Hart emphasizes, part of the challenge for those who would regulate morality 
is to identify the possibilities for change.  Must the Aztecs, for example, continue to 
honor human sacrifice or the United States take the position that the racial segregation 
deeply rooted in its traditions cannot be changed?18  Just as fundamental for the 
Hart/Devlin debate is the notion of harm.  Mill originated the idea of harm to others as 
the principal justification for state regulation of individual conduct.19  At what point can 
private consensual behavior between adults be said to affect anyone else?20  Perhaps the 
best answer for Devlin is Professor Jeffrie Murphy’s. "[O]ne might ... argue," he 
suggested, "that open toleration of the flouting of sexual norms threatens the honorific 
position historically accorded the traditional nuclear family and that such a threat risks 
undermining the social stability generated by such family units."21  If individuals do not 
have an obligation to resist “temptation,” if those around them engage in “sin” without 
condemnation or consequences, then the internalized norms of fidelity and commitment 
will atrophy, and a higher percentage of the next generation’s children will be raised in 
suboptimal circumstances.  Devlin’s position, as Murphy suggests, is that the 
internalization of shared norms is simultaneously fragile and fundamental to the society 
implementing it.  Nonetheless, it is still important to determine whether particular moral 
precepts remain “shared” or “fundamental” over time. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,22 overturning Texas’s 
criminal ban on same-sex sodomy, would appear to answer that at least for now the 
public attitude toward private sexual behavior between consulting adults has changed.  
Poll data supports the conclusion of a widespread change in attitudes.  The Gallup 
organization has polled American adults since 1977, asking whether they believe that 
homosexual activity should be criminalized:  
Date Legal Not legal No opinion
1977-JUN 43% 43 14 
1982-JUN 45 39 16 
1985-NOV 44 47 9 
1986-JUL 32 57 11 
1986-SEP 33 54 13 
1987-MAR 33 55 12 
1988-JUL 35 57 11 
1989-OCT 47 36 17 
1992-JUN 48 44 8 
1996-NOV 47 47 9 
                                                                                                                                                 
for the same society to continue to exist that it could be asserted without evidence that any deviation from a 
society's shared morality threatens its existence.”  Id. at 52. 
18 Moffat, supra, at 1104. 
19 See sources in note 13, supra. 
20 Id. at 1102.  
21 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 73, 77 (1995). 
22 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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1999-FEB 50 43 7 
2001-MAY 54 42 4 
2002-MAY 52 43 5 
2003-MAY 60 35 5 
These poll results show a substantial shift in attitudes over time, with 60% favoring the 
legalization of such behavior before the Supreme Court ruled on the issue in 2003.23   
The scholarly debate over Lawrence has focused less on the outcome, and 
more on the question of whether Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion simply declared 
such intimate behavior to be beyond the scope of legitimate government intervention, 
or went further to affirm the value and dignity of same-sex relationships.24  The 
majority opinion, acknowledging the “powerful voices” condemning homosexuality as 
immoral, nonetheless emphasized that the “issue is whether the majority may use the 
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of 
the criminal law.  ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
own moral code.’”25   Kennedy’s opinion underscored “the respect the Constitution 
demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices,” and cited the 
abortion cases to reiterate that: 
 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
                                                 
23 http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_poll2.htm, asking "Do you think homosexual relations between 
consenting adults should or should not be legal?”  Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Lawrence 
acknowledged the changing sentiment.  Kennedy observed that "later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress."  Lawrence at 579.  Scalia responded “and when 
that happens, later generations can repeal those laws.” Id. at 604. 
24 See David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U Chi Legal F 453, 466; Marybeth Herald, A 
Bedroom of One's Own:. Morality and Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 1, 30 (2004) ("Lawrence is also clear that the case did 'not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.' Thus, same-sex 
marriage and military service were explicitly excluded from the ruling."), Martin R. Gardner, Adoption 
by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 6 J. L. & FAM. STUDS. 19, 43 (2004)("There is 
good reason to disagree, however, with Justice Scalia's conclusion that Lawrence will inevitably lead to 
a constitutional requirement of homosexual marriages.").  See also Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, 
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1583 (2004) (criticizing Lawrence as 
a wrong-headed extension of substantive due process and wondering whether "something resembling 
the Playboy Philosophy will become the official doctrine of the United States"); cf. Katherine M. 
Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1399, 1417 (2004) ("Sex 
gets figured, if at all, in Lawrence as instrumental to the formation of intimate relationships-it seems not 
to have a social or legal status in its own right. As a result, sexual rights qua sexual are exiled from the 
legal struggle on behalf of gay men and lesbians."); Mark Strasser, Monogamy, Licentiousness, 
Desuetude And Mere Tolerance: The Multiple Misinterpretations Of Lawrence v. Texas, 15 S. Cal. 
Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 95 (2005) (summarizing different views and concluding that Lawrence 
should be seen as affirming gay, lesbian and other non-traditional relationships). 
25 Lawrence, supra at 571. 
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universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could 
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State.26
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion castigates the majority for “taking sides in the culture 
wars.”  Although Kennedy emphasized that the case did not address “whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons 
seek to enter,"27 Scalia responded,  
More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of 
thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the 
constitutional protections afforded to "personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and 
then declares that "persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for 
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."28
Lawrence, precisely because of its emphasis on privacy, leaves open the larger 
issue of the role of moral regulation in a democracy.  The state after all rarely polices 
consensual sexual behavior between adults, whether or not the conduct is legal; it 
routinely regulates the creation and dissolution of families.  Decisions about which 
relationships to recognize and which to ignore, which factors to recognize in custody 
decisions, and which family members to protect all involve moral judgments.29  In 
addition, while Hart argues persuasively that the “disintegration” that might be associated 
with private sexual conduct is too tangential a harm to justify punitive measures, the 
constitution and conduct of families affects children – often directly – and almost always 
as part a social compact that establishes the bases on which children receive support. 
The question accordingly arises is Scalia right?  Does Kennedy’s recognition of 
autonomy with respect to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education" necessarily mean that a 
liberal state must also recognize autonomy to create and win state recognition for the 
institutions necessary to implement such personal decisions? 
 
II. The Polarization of Family Values 
 
A. The Redefinition of Family Values 
 
While the regulation of family institutions (e.g., recognition of marriage, divorce 
and parentage) is distinct from the regulation of sexual conduct, both have historically 
rested on the same values.  Chancellor Kent, for example, in his summary of American 
law at the beginning of the nineteenth century, observed that: 
The primary and most important of the domestic relations is that of husband and 
wife.  It has its foundations in nature, and is the only lawful relation by which 
                                                 
26 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
27 Lawrence, supra at  578. 
28 Id. at 604. (Emphasis in Scalia’s original). 
29Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 225 (1997). 
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Providence has permitted the continuance of the human race.  In every age it has 
had a propitious influence on the moral improvement and happiness of mankind.  
It is one of the chief foundations of the moral order.  We may justly place to the 
credit of the institutional of marriage a great share of the blessings which flow 
from the refinement of manners, the education of children, the sense of justice, 
and cultivation of the liberal arts.30  
For Kent, the relation of “husband and wife” was a legal one separate from that of 
biological mother and father.  It had its “foundations in nature” in that marriage provided 
a providentially mandated way to channel the natural inclinations arising from sex and 
reproduction.31  It served, moreover, not just as the foundation of the moral order, but as 
a principal way to secure the “education of children,” a “sense of justice” and other 
practical ends important to a well functioning state.  Accordingly, a major purpose of 
domestic relations law was to distinguish between properly constituted versus illicit 
relations.  Sexual morality and family regulation were intricately intertwined.   
 Modern critics, in contrast, have charged that contemporary family law no longer 
serves to promote marriage as the foundation of the moral order.  These criticisms have 
two components.  First, a series of scholars, starting with Carl Schneider, claim “a 
diminution of the law's discourse in moral terms about the relations between family 
members, and the transfer of many moral decisions from the law to the people the law 
once regulated.”32  Moral values, and the promotion of the conduct associated with them, 
have become the province of private institutions and individual actors rather than the 
state.  A second group maintains that the state, while it may endorse some values, fails to 
promote the right ones.  These advocates maintain “that traditional families--two parent, 
heterosexual married couples with children--are essential to a healthy society and must be 
encouraged.”33  What the critics have largely not considered is the possibility that the 
states, entrusted in the American federal system with primarily responsibility for the 
regulation of family law, may be adopting not only different, but incompatible systems. 
                                                 
30 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 12th ed., ed. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1896), Vol. 2, 76. 
31 See, e.g., Stephen J. Pope, “Sex, Marriage and Family Life: The Teachings of Nature,” in Family 
Transformed: Religion Values, and Society in American Life, Steven M. Tipton and John Witte, Jr., eds. 
(2005) Georgetown University Press, at 65. 
32 Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 
1803, 1808-09 (1985).  See also Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 865, 879 
(1989) ("state intervention into family life . . . is less likely now than previously to be based on moral 
judgments"); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443, 1527 (1992) 
(arguing that the "increased dissociation of law and morality . . . is directly linked to the privatization of 
family law"); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Last Decade(s) of American Family Law, 46 J. Legal Educ. 546, 547 
(1996) (noting a decline in moral discourse in some areas of family law). 
33 Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility And Commitment To Children: The New Language Of Morality 
In Family Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (1999)(summarizing debate and arguing that in fact family 
law promotes a different and more appropriate set of values).  See also Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, 
Marriage, And Morality: The Pro-Marriage Moral Discourse Of American Welfare Policy,19 Wis. 
Women's L.J. 1, 23 (2004)(summarizing the argument of marriage advocates that “over the past forty years 
there has been an "extraordinary shift in cultural norms concerning sex, marriage, and childbearing," 
including the advent of birth control, the entry of more women into the labor force, and the increasing 
acceptability of cohabitation outside of wedlock.  . . . Widened opportunities for women, including 
alternatives to marriage, that were the fruits of the women's and civil rights movements are constitutive of 
this normative shift.”) 
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 Family law scholars have, however, charted the emergence of a set of values 
different from those Chancellor Kent championed.  Naomi Cahn, for example, argued 
almost a decade ago that a newly evolving morality recognized responsibility for children 
as a familial obligation, albeit with public support, made gender equity a “primary 
objective,” and placed individual rights “within the contexts of community, equality, and 
commitment.”34  Jane Murphy seconded the idea, maintaining that there is a “broader 
concept of morality” that emphasizes the “virtues of care and protection of children” and 
addresses “issues that are more commonly thought of as economic or psychological 
issues, such as how to guarantee adequate support for children and how to evaluate 
parental fitness.”35
 This alternative set of family values, with its emphasis on care and support for 
children, draws as much on Anglo-American tradition as the model that rests on sexual 
regularity.  Lawrence Stone, in his history of the family in England, emphasized the 
relatively high portions of the population who never married, and the relatively late of 
marriage for those who did, as “an extraordinarily and unique feature of north-west 
European civilization.”36  Stone explained that while in some parts of the world 
newlyweds remained with their parents, the English tradition (and that of northwestern 
Europe more generally), emphasized the ability to establish a financially independent 
household as the indication of readiness for marriage.  Moral responsibility meant 
financial as well as sexual restraint in preparation for parenthood. 
 In similar fashion, a shift in investment strategies produced a transformation in 
family norms in the nineteenth century U.S.  With industrialization, the professions and 
the executive ranks replaced farms and shops as the most secure avenues to middle class 
status.  Prescient families began to invest more in their son’s formal education and 
daughters’ virtue, and to keep their growing children more carefully supervised in the 
home.  As a result, the average age of marriage rose, the number of births per family fell, 
women gained greater status as the guardians of family virtue, 37 greater condemnation 
attended engagement-period intercourse, and pregnancy rates fell from one-third of 
brides to ten percent by mid-century.38   The Protestant middle class remade “family 
values” and celebrated their moral superiority to the detriment of Catholic immigrants, 
freed slaves and others who could not afford to keep women and children insulated from 
temptation.39  These values, firmly cemented within the northwest European tradition to 
                                                 
34 Cahn, supra, at 270-71. 
35 Murphy, supra, at 1204.  
36 Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800, abridged ed. 44 (1979). 
37 See Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'": A Feminist 
Rethinking Of Seduction, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 374, 388 (1993). (“Victorian culture exalted sexual restraint 
and designated women as caretakers of society's sexual virtue.”)  Larson also notes, however, that: 
“Although the Victorian convention of female sexual modesty repressed women's sexuality, it also 
strengthened women's social authority and dignity, empowering women to resist male sexual demands and 
thus shifting the balance of power between men and women in the private sphere.”  Id. at 389-90.   
38See Carl N. Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present 9, 
180-83 (1980)(on declining birth rates that followed women’s greater ability to decline sexual intercourse). 
Linda Hirshman & Jane Larson, Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex (1998). (The number of women giving 
birth within eight and a half months of marriage fell from thirty percent at the end of the eighteenth century 
to ten percent by the middle of nineteenth.)   
39 For discussion of the class and racial aspects of these developments, see June Carbone, From Partners to 
Parents: The Second Revolution in Family Law 108-110 (2000).  See also Larson, supra at 388, n 55, 
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which Americans are heirs, continued to herald financial independence and investment in 
children as hallmarks of family morality.  
 The twentieth century’s post-industrial economy further remade the family 
bargain.  The rise of the service section increased demand for women’s market services, 
and rewarded greater investment in women.  Women then reorganized themselves as 
higher earning women hired other women (and McDonald’s and frozen foods) to provide 
the less specialized services they had once performed within the home.  As women joined 
men in securing higher education, the new path to secure middle class status lay in 
delayed marriage and childbearing for women as well as men.  Ironically, the new 
movement grew out of the fifties in which all of the trends that had otherwise 
characterized the twentieth century reversed themselves.  Stephanie Coontz writes that 
“[f]or the first time in more than one hundred years, the age for marriage and motherhood 
fell, fertility increased, divorce rates declined, and women’ degree of educational parity 
with men dropped sharply.”40  The solution was the pill in the sixties, abortion in the 
seventies, and the effective disappearance of the norms of sexual restraint for adult 
singles.   By 1997, the Gallup poll found that fifty-five percent of American adults say 
that premarital sex is not wrong, and among the most directly affected, viz., the younger 
crowd aged 18-29, 75% agreed that “pre-marital sexual relations are not wrong.”41  The 
new middle class pathway separated sex and childbearing; improvident childbearing 
could still derail a woman’s education, marriage and income prospects, while the former 
had become available without stigma or commitment.42
 As with the nineteenth century changes, the twentieth century changes in 
women’s status and independence changed the terms on which they were willing to enter 
into and stay in marriages.  Stephanie Coontz comments that: 
As women gained experience and self-confidence, they won benefits that made 
work more attractive and rewarding; with longer work experience and greater 
educational equalization, they became freer to leave an unhappy marriage; and as 
divorce became more of a possibility, women tended to hedge their bets by 
insisting on the right to work.  Although very few researchers believe that 
women=s employment has been a direct cause of the rising divorce rate, most 
agree that women=s new employment options have made it easier for couples to 
                                                                                                                                                 
observing that : “The separate spheres ideology largely applied to white, middle-class, heterosexual 
women. Although society measured women outside this category against these feminine ideals of sexual 
purity and domesticity (often to their detriment), more marginalized women were rarely accorded the moral 
authority and social respect which the separate spheres ideology implied that all women deserved. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South 192-
241 (1988) (describing gulf between slaveholding and enslaved women in the antebellum American South); 
Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to 
the Present 1-151 (1985) (comparing experience of free and enslaved black women in southern United 
States).” 
40 Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap 202-03 (1992). 
41Frank Newport, Gallup Poll Review From The Poll Editors: Sexual Norms: Where Does America Stand 
Today? The Gallup Poll, December, 1997,  http://www.hi-ho.ne.jp/taku77/refer/sexnorm.htm. 
42 Whitehead notes that ninety percent of women born between 1933 and 1942 were either virgins when 
they married to had first intercourse with the man they married.  Today, in contrast, the average age of first 
intercourse for women is 17 while the average age of first marriage is twenty-five.  Barbara Dafoe 
Whitehead, “The Changing Pathway to Marriage: Trends in Dating, First Unions, and Marriage among 
Young Adults,” in Tipton and Waite, supra, at 170.  
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separate if they are dissatisfied for other reasons.   In turn, the fragility of 
marriage has joined economic pressures, income incentives, educational 
preparation, and dissatisfaction with domestic isolation as one of the reasons that 
modern women choose to work.43
The economic coercion that complemented the moral suasion of the older family system 
gave way, and so did the effectiveness of the mechanisms that promoted family stability 
for centuries. 
 As Cahn and Murphy emphasized, however, the results are not entirely unhappy 
ones.  The new middle class morality emphasizes the financial contributions of mothers 
and fathers, and it celebrates marriage in terms of equality and companionship.  While the 
research evidence on marital happiness is mixed, there are many reasons to believe that 
the most troubled adults have become less likely to marry or stay married, those who rate 
their relationships fair or equitable are more likely to stay together, and two incomes have 
become critical to families’ financial well-being for all but the wealthiest Americans.44  
The middle class may see no alternative to the strategy of later, more egalitarian 
marriages – at least on the coasts. 
 The families of a large part of the rest of the country, however, are in crisis.  The 
combination of the atrophy of the traditional constraints on sexual behavior with the 
difficulty of engineering the new middle class ideal of companionate relationships has 
undermined the conventional links between adult resources and support for children.  For 
the country as a whole, non-marital births have risen to a third of the total.  Divorce rates 
has risen steadily from 5% of marriages in 1867, to 10% of those contracted in 1900, to 
half of those in 1967, and perhaps as many as two-thirds of those who married in 1980.45  
Half of American children can expect to live in a single parent family at some point in 
their childhood, and the outcomes for children in single parent families are demonstrably 
worse on a host of measures than for those in married families.  Moreover, some scholars 
argue that even though more troubled adults have become less likely to marry, the quality 
of marital happiness has not risen.  Robert Wurthrow, for example, cites poll data that 
shows 62.4% of married couples claiming to be very happy in 2000 compared to 67.8% 
in 1973.46  And these issues do not play out evenly across the country.  Instead, they 
divide by race, income, education -- and geography.  The “blue” states, that is, the states 
that voted Democratic in the last presidential elections, show the lowest rates of teen 
pregnancy, divorce, and poverty; the “red” states, which voted Republican in the last 
election, show the highest rates of improvident teen births and divorce.   
The “red states” also believe they have an answer – a much higher percentage of 
                                                 
43 Coontz, Nostalgia, supra, at 166. 
44 See, e.g., John M. Gottman et al., Predicting Marital Happiness and Stability from Newlywed 
Interactions, 60 J. Marriage & Fam. 5 (1998) (stating men's rejection of their wives' influence best predicts 
divorce); Kristi Williams, Has the Future of Marriage Arrived? A Contemporary Examination of Gender, 
Marriage, and Psychological Well-Being, 44 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 470-487 (Dec., 
2003)(individuals are better divorced than in unhappy marriages).  But see Robert Wurthnow, “The Family 
as Contested Terrain,” in Tipton and Witte, supra, at 74 summarizing evidence of greater unhappiness of 
those currently married in comparison with earlier areas, and greater well-being of the married compared to 
the unmarried. 
45 Wurthrow, supra, at 74, noting that while divorce rates have leveled off more recently, the change is due 
in part to the fact that fewer couples are marrying.  Any effect of greater self-selection today may not 
necessarily be reflected in those married in 1980. 
46 Id. at 74. 
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their populations would say “no” to the new middle class morality of unregulated sex and 
egalitarian marriage.  Instead, they would embrace a more traditional, and more 
religiously grounded, definition of family morality.  Critical to that definition is the unity 
of sex, marriage, and reproduction. A recently released letter from the Religious 
Coalition for Marriage, for example, explains:  
Marriage is particularly important for the rearing of children as they flourish best 
under the long term care and nurture of their father and mother. For this and other 
reasons, when marriage is entered into and gotten out of lightly, when it is no 
longer the boundary of sexual activity, or when it is allowed to be radically 
redefined, a host of personal and civic ills can be expected to follow.47   
The marriage movement, which has been more influential in red states than blue ones,48 
would accordingly advocate greater emphasis on the distinction between licit and illicit 
sex, greater commitment to marriage, and reaffirmation of the importance of the 
biological two parent family. 
 In addition, many of the researchers supporting these movements believe that 
traditional notions of family and a gendered division of family responsibilities are critical 
to the outcome.  All researchers report that women are more likely than men to initiate 
divorce, and that women’s emotional satisfaction in marriage is a factor in predicting 
divorce.  Steven L. Nock and Bradford Wilcox and Steven L. Nock, recent study, "What's 
Love Got To Do With It?: Equality, Equity, Commitment and Women's Marital 
Quality,49" finds further that married women are happier if they hold traditional rather 
than egalitarian expectations about marriage, and if they share with their husbands high 
levels of church attendance and normative commitment to marriage as an institution.  The 
study suggests that traditional wives may be happier because they expect less, and thus, 
when they get less, they are not disappointed.50 At the same time, by expecting less, they 
might actually persuade their husbands to be more emotionally responsive and to invest 
more, because the husbands experience less conflict with their wives over the household 
division of labor.51  In short, socialization for commitment and acceptance of traditional 
gender roles may be necessary to promote marital success. 
 Whether or not these positions are empirically true,52 they represent 
fundamentally different approaches to family regulation.  One emphasizes the 
internalization of norms of sexual restraint, a gendered division of family responsibilities, 
and commitment to marriage.  The other insists on commitment to gender equality, 
financial and emotional preparation for childrearing, greater investment in women and 
children, and individual autonomy rather than community centered support for families.  
Fully implemented they support radically different lifestyles and family law systems.   
                                                 
47 Religious Coalition for Marriage, A Letter from America’s Religious Leaders in  Defense of Marriage 
(2006), http://www.religiouscoalitionformarriage.org. 
48 See data below. 
49 84 Social Forces 1321( March 2006). 
50 Id. at 1324. 
51 Id. at 1325-28. 
52 For a response to Nock and Wilcox, for example, see Joanna Grossman And Linda Mcclain, “Desperate 
Feminist Wives":Does The Quest For Marital Equality Doom Marital Happiness? Findlaw: Legal News 
And Commentary, April 4, 2006, Http://Writ.News.Findlaw.Com/Commentary/20060404_Mcclain.Html
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B. Demographic Divisions 
 The debate over family values is intense not just because the positions differ 
ideologically, but because they correspond to different lived experiences, and different 
family systems in various parts of the country.  Naomi Cahn and I are in the process of 
bringing together a variety of statistical measures that create a picture of these two 
different family systems.  The statistics below provide a preliminary, broad brush 
depiction of the differences in lifestyles that have emerged between the two systems.53
 Take, first, the experience of marriage and childbearing.  In 2000, the mean age of 
the mother at her first live birth for the nation as a whole was 24.9.  Yet, the states with 
the highest average ages were entirely “blue:”54 Massachusetts led at 27.8, followed by 
Connecticut (27.2), New Jersey (27.1), New Hampshire (26.7), and New York (26.4).  
The states with the lowest average ages were entirely red: Arkansas had the lowest (22.7), 
followed by Louisiana and New Mexico (23.0), Oklahoma (23.1), and Wyoming (23.2).55  
Over the past 30 years, all states have experienced an increase in the mean age of mothers 
at which the first child is born, but the changes range from a 5.3 year increase in 
Massachusetts to a 1.9 year increase in Utah.56
 Add in now the average age of marriage.  In the United States, the median age of 
marriage for women is 25.1, 26.7 for men.57  In contrast, in 1960, the median age at first 
marriage was 20.3 for women, and 22.8 for men.58    The five states with the lowest 
median age of marriage for women are red: Utah (23.9, 21.9), Oklahoma (24.9, 22.7), 
Idaho (24.6, 22.8), Arkansas (25, 22.8), and Kentucky (25.3, 22.8).  Correspondingly, the 
states with the highest median age of marriage for women are blue: Massachusetts (29.1, 
27.4), New York (28.9, 27), Rhode Island (27.6, 26.7), Connecticut (28.9, 26.4), and New 
Jersey (28.6, 26.4).59   
 The differences between an average first birth at 22.7 versus 27.8 are substantial.  
So are the differences in marriage ages from 21.9 to 27.4 for women, and 23.9 to 29.1 for 
                                                 
53 The single biggest limitation in these general statistics are the failure to break down the characteristics by 
race.  
54 The blue states are:  California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and WIsconsin.  The rest are red.  See Michael Gastner, Cosma 
Shalizi, and Mark Newman, et al., Maps and cartograms of the 2004 US presidential election results,  
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/election.  As they emphasize, however, using a scale of percentage 
of voters results in a map that is more purple than red.  Id.; see Robert J. Vanderbiel, Election 2004 Results, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~rvdb/JAVA/election2004/ 
55 T.J. Mathews and Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000 10 (Table 3) (2002), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf.  
56   Id. 
57 Tallese Johnson and Jane Dye, Indicators of Marriage and Fertility in the United States from th American 
Community Survey: 2000 to 2003, Table 1 (2005), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/fertility/mar-fert-slides.html.   
58   Infoplease, Median Age at First marriage, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html.  On the other 
hand, in 1890, the median age of first marriage for men was 26.1, and 22.0 for women. 
59   Id. at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/fertility/slideshow/table01.csv   
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men.   Testosterone levels peak in the mid-twenties.  Helen Fisher observes that higher 
testosterone levels can reduce oxytocin and vasopressin, making attachment less likely,60 
and that "men with high baseline levels of testosterone marry less frequently, have more 
adulterous affairs, commit more spousal abuse, and divorce more often."61  In addition, 
new research on brain development indicates that the areas in the brain associated with 
higher level reasoning, maturity and judgment do not fully mature until the mid-twenties.  
Less mature adults engage in higher levels of risk-taking, may have less impulse control, 
and display less judgment than they will at older ages.  Couples marrying and giving birth 
in their late twenties should have fully developed mental faculties, and begun to settle 
down; couples still in their early twenties are still developing, experimenting, and 
“sowing their wild oats.”   
 Divorce statistics bear out these predictions. The states with the highest divorce 
rates are red: Nevada, Wyoming, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi and Florida, while 
those with the lowest are primarily blue: Massachusetts, followed by Pennsylvania, North 
Dakota, Illinois, and Connecticut.62   Researchers confirm that a younger age of marriage, 
lower economic status, and having a baby either prior to marriage or within the first 
seven months after marriage each increases the risk of divorce, holding other factors 
constant.63   
 These statistics suggest that red state characteristics combine the factors that make 
family instability more likely to occur.  That is, younger marriages, especially if they are 
prompted by an improvident pregnancy, increase divorce rates.  So, too, does lower 
socio-economic status, and red states, which may be more likely to reject middle class 
strategies because they are poorer or poorer because they reject middle class family 
strategies, are not as well off as red states. 
 The risk factors for red states involve more than divorce.  Teen births are also 
higher.  The five states with the lowest teen birth rates were New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine; the states with the highest teen birth rates were 
Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi, Arizona, and Arkansas.64  On the other hand, while the 
percent of nonmarital teen births in the United States was 82% in 2004, the states with 
the lowest percentage of teen births to nonmarital mothers were Idaho, with 64%, Utah, 
with 66%, Texas, with 73%, and Colorado, Kentucky, and Wyoming, each with 74%.65  
Those states with the highest percentage of nonmarital teen births were Massachusetts 
(92%), Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island (91%), and Connecticut and Maryland 
                                                 
60
 Fisher, Why We Love, at 90. 
61 Id. 
62 U.S.  Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2005-2006 93 (Table No. 117) 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/vitstat.pdf.    
63   Paul Amato and Stacy Rogers, ; Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and David Popenoe,  The State of Our 
Unions:  The Social Health of Marriage in America, Box 2 (2004), 
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/TEXTSOOU2004.htm#Divorce 
64 Child Trends, Teen Birth Rates Ranked Lowest to Highest, 2003, 
http://www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2006StatebyState.pdf. 
65  ChildTrends, Facts at a Glance, Table 1 (2006), http://www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2006.pdf 
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(90%).66  In other words, one set of states has lower teen birth rates, and higher rates of 
nonmarital births, while a second set tends to have higher teen birth rates, but more births 
occurring within marriage,67 and, correspondingly, younger ages of marriage.68   
 Abortion ratios complete the picture.  Blue states had the ratios of abortions per 
1,000 live births: New York, Delaware, Washington, Massachusetts, and Connecticut   
each had a ratio over 300.  The states with the lowest abortion ratios, with rates under 
100, were red: Colorado, Utah, Idaho, and South Dakota.69   Similarly, states with the 
lowest abortion rates – number of abortions per 1000 women between the ages of 15-44 – 
were Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota, while those with the highest 
abortion rates were New York, Delaware, Washington, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.70   
 These figures confirm once again the existence of two different family systems: 
one creating pressures for early marriage and childbearing.   The other for avoiding teen 
births – and early marriages – through measures that include greater resort to abortion.   
 The final figures involve overall fertility.  The percent of childless women is 
highest in the Northeast states, and lowest in the southern states.71  The nineteen states 
with the highest fertility rates are red, while the 16 states with the lowest fertility rates are 
blue.72  In the United States, there are 1,182 children born for every 1,000 women.73  
Alaska has the highest fertility rate, with 1,435 children born per 1,000 women, followed 
by Arkansas (1,418), Utah and Mississippi (1,393), and South Dakota (1,368).  The states 
                                                 
66  Id. 
67 Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, among the states with the lowest teen birth rate, also had high 
percentages of nonmarital teen births: in Vermont, it was 87%, New Hampshire 89%, and Maine 88%.  Id.    
The percent of births to teen mothers with respect to all births in the state was highest in New Mexico 
(17%), followed by Mississippi (16%),Arkansas and Louisiana (15%),  and Alabama and Oklahoma (14%).  
Id.  The lowest percentages were in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont (6%), and 
Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, and Utah (7%).    
68 The overall rate of non-marital births is harder to assess, in part, because of the influence of race.  The 
states with the highest overall rates of non-marital births (D.C., Miss., and La.) all have high African-
American populations.  The states with the lowest rates (Utah, Idaho, and Minnesota) have much lower 
rates.   See http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ib22.html. 
69 Laurie D. Elam-Evans, Abortion Surveillance, United States, 2000 (29 (Table 3)(2003), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5212a1.htm. Florida and Louisiana had low rates as well, 
but did not report the number of abortions with respect to in-state residents.  Id. 
70   Id.  States with incomplete measures of were again excluded, as was the District of Columbia. 
71  Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women:  June 2004 4 (Table 2)(2005), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf.  It was 48% in the northeast, which includes Maine, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania; and 42.5% in the south, which included Delaware, Maryland, DC, Virginia, West Virgina, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.  The statistics did not include a further breakdown by state.   
72 Steve Sailer, Birth Gap:  How birthrates color the Electoral Map, The American Conservative (Dec. 
2004), http://www.amconmag.com/2004_12_06/cover.html. 
73 U.S. Census Bureau,  Fertility of American Women, Table S1 (June 2004),  
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/tabS1.xls.  D.C.  is, once again, an outlier, with a 
fertility rate of 776.  States with the lowest fertility rates for never-married women were mixed, with Utah, 
a red state, with the lowest rate of 208, followed by Delaware (213), Minnesota (234), North Dakota (241), 
Idaho (247), and New Hampshire (254). Id. 
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with the lowest fertility rates are: Maryland (991), Vermont (1,000), Massachusetts 
(1,020), Maine (1,022), and Delaware (1,023). 
 While these statistics cannot provide a complete view of different cultural values, 
they suggest that red state and blue state families are living different lives. 
C. Legal Fractures 
 The largest difference in the two family systems involves the regulation of 
sexuality.  One system deregulates sexuality, but discourages early childbearing; the 
other system attempts to reinforce the link between sexuality and marriage.  
Comprehensive differences, some minor, others profound, divide the family law systems 
among the states.  Two flashpoints, in particular though, symbolize the divide among the 
states. 
 The first is abortion.  Given the Supreme Court’s recognition of a women’s right 
to choose, a central battleground has been parental notification laws.74  Carol Sanger  
argues that, although these laws are framed as representing children’s interests, they in 
fact represent a political decision on behalf of third parties to prevent minors from 
obtaining abortions, to reinforce parental authority, and to punish the girls for their sexual 
behavior.75   Childbirth as the price of illicit sex is an important factor in reinforcing a 
traditional understanding of sexual morality.76
 An overwhelming majority of states require some form of parental involvement, 
generally subject to the judicial bypass option.  In 21 states, parental consent is required 
before a minor can obtain an abortion, with two red states (Mississippi and North Dakota) 
mandating that both parents consent, while in 13 states, parental notification is required.77  
In another nine states – Alaska, California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico -- enforcement of statutes requiring parental 
involvement has been permanently enjoined.78  Seven states, all of which are blue – 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington -- do not 
                                                 
74 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 126 S. Ct. 961, 966, n.1 (2006) (noting that 44 states have enacted 
laws mandating parental involvement).  In four of those states, there is no exception to the parental 
involvement requirement based on an emergency concerning the minor’s health). 
75  Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States:  Politics and Policy, 18 Intl. J.L. & 
Pol’y & Fam. 305, 315 (2004). 
76 The argument extends to more than abortion.  See, e.g., Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, New York 
Times Magazine, May 7, 2007. ("We see a direct connection between the practice of contraception and the 
practice of abortion," says Judie Brown, president of the American Life League, an organization that has 
battled abortion for 27 years but that, like others, now has a larger mission. "The mind-set that invites a 
couple to use contraception is an antichild mind-set," she told me. "So when a baby is conceived 
accidentally, the couple already have this negative attitude toward the child. Therefore seeking an abortion 
is a natural outcome. We oppose all forms of contraception.") 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/magazine/07contraception.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
77 Guttmacher Institute, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions (Jan. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.   
78   Id. 
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require any form of parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions.79  Studies show 
that parental involvement laws result in fewer abortions and more births.80   
 The second and most perplexing is gay marriage.  Supporters of the new middle 
class model adopted by Blue America simply do not get it.  One op-ed piece titled “Gay 
Marriage: Why Would It Affect Me?” observed:  
When opponents talk about the “defense of marriage,” they lose me. James 
Dobson’s Focus on the Family just sent out a mailer to 2.5 million homes saying: 
“The homosexual activists’ movement is poised to administer a devastating and 
potentially fatal blow to the traditional family.” And I say, “Huh?” How does 
anyone’s pledge of love and commitment turn into a fatal blow to families?81
 
Dobson responded, referring to Genesis: 
The legalization of homosexual marriage will quickly destroy the traditional 
family.  . . . [W]hen the State sanctions homosexual relationships and gives them 
its blessing, the younger generation becomes confused about sexual identity and 
quickly loses its understanding of lifelong commitments, emotional bonding, 
sexual purity, the role of children in a family, and from a spiritual perspective, the 
“sanctity” of marriage. Marriage is reduced to something of a partnership that 
provides attractive benefits and sexual convenience, but cannot offer the intimacy 
described in Genesis. Cohabitation and short-term relationships are the inevitable 
result.82  
 This debate replicates the earlier disagreements on the regulation of morality that 
occupied Hart and Devlin.  Naomi Cahn and I have argued that the biological evidence 
suggests that human beings as a species are in fact more geared to serial monogamy (i.e., 
“cohabitation and short-term relationships”) than long term fidelity.83  The more difficult 
it is to rechannel behavior, the more important (and fragile) internalized norms become. 
Ariela Dubler writes that the Christian constructions of sexual morality that influenced 
American judges and continue to influence contemporary politics “posited marriage as 
                                                 
79   “Blue” states voted Democratic in the 2004 election.  See infra nn. __. 
80 See, e.g,, Michael J. New, Using Natural Experiments to Analyze the Impact of State Legislation on the 
Incidence of Abortion (2006), www.heritage.org/Researc/Family/cda06-01.cfm.  He found: 
when a parental involvement law is enacted, the abortion rate decreases by 16.37 abortions for 
every thousand live births [the abortion ratio] and the abortion rate decrease by 1.15 abortions for 
every thousand women between the ages of 15 to 44 [the abortion rate].  Parental involvement 
laws that are passed and then nullified by the judiciary result in modest increases in the abortion 
rate and a modest decline in the abortion ration. 
Id. at 11. See also Theodore Joyce, Robert Kaestner, and Silvie Colman, Changes in Abortions and Births 
and the Texas Parental Notification Law, 354 New Eng. L. Med. 1031 (2006). 
81Dr. James Dobson, “Eleven Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage,” CitizenLink.org, May 23, 2004 
http://www.family.org/cforum/extras/a0032427.cfm, citing a column by Steve Blow in the Dallas Morning 
News. 
82 Dobson, id. (Emphasis in original). 
83 The Biological Basis of Commitment: Does One Size Fit All?  June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, 25 
Women's Rights L. Rep. 223 (2004). 
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the site where lust was transformed into virtue.”84    If it is part of human nature to 
experience lust, to be tempted to engage in illicit acts that range from bestiality to 
adultery, then the preservation of marriage as a privileged state is necessary to resist 
those temptations.  Redefining marriage to include “sinful acts”85 or to recognize 
relationships based on something other than the unity of sex, reproduction and 
childrearing undermines the enterprise.  If anyone can claim the blessings of marriage, 
what is the point of abstinence?  If the relationship does not elevate those within it, why 
work to maintain the institution when life turns difficult?  The issue is inflamed further 
by the identification of gays and sometimes lesbians with greater promiscuity, within or 
without marriage.86  Yet, for the upwardly mobile middle class, who replaced abstinence 
with an emphasis on emotional and financial preparation for childrearing, the argument is 
barely cognizable.  The “huh?” response is real. 
 State legislation reflects the divide.  Thirty-three states now have statutory bans 
on marriage for same-sex couples, and six have enacted constitutional amendments 
banning gay marriage.87  Sixteen of the seventeen states with some form of constitutional 
amendment or statute adopting broader anti-gay measures are red, while only one is blue 
(Michigan). The only red states not to have some form of anti-gay measure are Wyoming 
and New Mexico.  In contrast, the other seven states without any form of anti-gay 
measure are Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont – lean blue.   The six states to extend same-sex couples legal 
recognition and benefits comparable to marriage are all blue.88  
                                                 
84Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex 115 Yale L.J. 756, 763 (2006). 
85 See Dubler’s comment that: “Marriage is at once powerful to confer legal privileges and to shield people 
from the dangers of sexual illicitness, and powerless to protect itself from the taint of those very illicit 
practices.”  Id. at 812. 
86 See, e.g.,  Religious Coalition for Marriage, Top 10 Social Scientific Arguments Against Same Sex 
Marriage 4, http://www.religiouscoalitionformarriage.org/html/top_ten.php, observing that: 
In the first edition of his book in defense of marriage, Virtually Normal, Andrew Sullivan wrote:  
“There is more likely to be greater understanding of the need for extramarital outlets between two 
men than between a man and a woman.” . . . One recent study of civil unions and marriages in 
Vermont suggests this is a very real concern.  More than 79 percent of heterosexual  married men 
and women, along with lesbians in civil unions, reported that they strongly valued sexual fidelity.  
Only about 50 percent of gay men in civil unions valued sexual fidelity. 
In addition, younger ages of marriage also change the context for recognizing homosexuality, with gays 
and lesbians more likely to “come out of the closet” in Red America the time of divorce, linking 
homosexuality in the minds of some with adultery.  In communities with later average ages at marriage, 
and more gay friendly environments, the link does not exist. 
87 http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf.   
88   See Leslie Harris, Same-Sex Unions Around the World:  Marriage, Civil Unions, Registered 
Partnerships—What are the Differences and Why do the Matter?, 19 Probate & Property 31, 33 (Sept/Oct 
2005); Human Rights Campaign, Relationship Recognition in the U.S., 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=26860&TEMPLATE=/ContentManage
ment/ContentDisplay.cfm  Maine’s legislation, which is the most limited, allows both same-sex and 
opposite sex couples to register for domestic partnership, a status which grants various rights in protective 
proceeding and intestacy; California, Connecticut, and Vermont offer couples almost all of the rights 
associated with marriage (Vermont and Connecticut’s legislation are limited to same-sex partners); New 
Jersey and Hawaii offer somewhat less expansive rights.  Id.  
18 
 The efforts to control sexuality extend across a broader, if less publicized, front. 
They include greater scrutiny into non-marital cohabitation in custody cases, continuing 
recognition of adultery in custody or financial awards, and the more celebrated efforts to 
adopt covenant marriage.  While adoption of such measures is far from uniform, 
enforcement may be uneven, and support for the return of fault is mixed even in the 
reddest of red states, these measures, together with the high profiles fights over abortion 
and gay marriage, suggest the existence of two internally coherent, and incompatible 
family law systems.   
III. Can Individuals Exercise Autonomy in the Selection of Institutions? 
 The emerging differences in family law raise an issue that does not exist at a time 
of consensus about family values: viz., how much deference should be given, in the 
selection of institutions as opposed to private beliefs and practices, to individual 
autonomy.  The question is one with deep roots within liberal democracies.   
 John Rawls, after his enormously influential theory of justice,89 wrote Political 
Liberalism precisely to address the obligations of liberalism in such circumstances.  He 
observed that a “modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”90  To deal with this plurality of 
views, Rawls advanced the idea of the “overlapping consensus,” which he defined not 
just as a modus viviendi to which parties agreed to the extent it advanced their short term 
self-interest, but to which they adhered because it reflected a deep moral commitment on 
the basis of their individual comprehensive schemes.91  Rawls emphasized that the “fact 
that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds does not make their 
affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the case may be, since the 
grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their affirmation.”92
 Opposition to polygamy at the time of the nineteenth century cases – and 
probably still today – provides such an example.  The United States in the nineteenth 
century thought of itself as a Christian nation, if not a Baptist, or Catholic one, and all of 
the different Christian churches, and most modern secular and moral philosophies in the 
United States today, oppose polygamy.  Accordingly, the U.S. as a liberal state could 
justify outlawing polygamy without necessarily embracing all or any one of the different 
justifications for doing so.  Moreover, as the Supreme Court’s invocation of Lieber’s 
political philosophy indicated, the Court could uphold such a restriction not just because 
of widespread consensus, but because it found such principles consistent with equality 
and equal respect within a liberal democracy.93
                                                 
89 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
90 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xvi (1993). 
91 Id. at 147. 
92 Id. at 147-48. 
93 Id. at 337-38. 
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 Conversely, in dealing with churches, Rawls, the U.S. Constitution and almost all 
theories of liberalism distinguish between the authority churches hold over their members 
because of the members’ consent, and the authority of the state to compel membership, or 
to enforce the precepts of a particular church or religion.94   Liberalism began as a 
response to the wars fought over established churches,95 and neutrality among competing 
visions of the good may be its most important contribution.  The American state may thus 
permit free expression and encourage religious worship as critical to the inculcation of 
virtue,96 but still stay out of regulation of churches as institutions.  Indeed, the Universal 
Life Church, which offers on-line ordination to anyone who applies, provides a 
wonderful example.97  The state does not oversee the church or its power to grant 
ordination.  But it does recognize the ordination as conferring the power to conduct a 
marriage ceremony.   
 Individual states could, of course, deal with the clash in family systems on the 
same model as religion, and some countries have.  Commentators have proposed that the 
state recognize only civil unions; that is, that the state administer only the financial and 
practical consequences of marriage.  Ceremonial marriage along with its ritual and 
emotional components would be relegated to the private sphere.  The state would replace 
marriage licenses with civil union certificates allowing couples to choose the church, 
synagogue, commitment ceremony or universal life minister of their choice to perform 
the ceremony – or to restrict their relationship to the civil aspects recognized by the 
state.98   
 This approach, however, would institutionalize the blue state deregulation of 
sexuality more than it would maintain parity among the competing systems.  The problem 
is that formal neutrality, desirable though it may be with respect to speech and private 
conduct, and critical though it may be with respect to such essential clashes as those over 
religion, may not be enough to address the expressive role of the state.  Libertarian 
Robert Nozick has written that  
[w]ithin the operations of democratic institutions, too, we want expressions of the 
values that concern us and bind us together.  The libertarian position I once 
propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully 
knit the humane considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for 
more closely into its fabric.  It neglected the symbolic importance of an official 
political concern with issues or problems, as a way of marking their importance or 
urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, channeling, encouraging, and 
validating our private actions and concerns toward them.99
                                                 
94 Id. at 221-222. 
95 Id. at xxiv. 
96 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes 257 (1991). 
97 See http://www.ulc.org. 
98 Edward A. Zelinsky, Symposium Abolishing Civil Marriage: Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage 
Case For Abolishing Civil Marriage,  27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161 (2006) 
99 Robert Nozick, The Examined Life 286-87 (1989). 
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 The expression of traditional family values in red states, and for many in the 
country as a whole, is a matter of urgency because of the state of our families.  
Channeling appropriate intimate behavior is challenging, and the institutions that have 
historically inculcated and policed family norms have atrophied.  The problems are 
particularly great for those ready to assume adult responsibilities at younger ages, and for 
those most directly threatened by the transition to a post-industrial economy.   The 
reaffirmation of shared values and the “symbolic importance of . . . official political 
concern” becomes particularly important when those values are seen as under assault. 
 The ability of the state to act at all in this arena therefore involves a choice 
between the two sets of values, and it is not a choice that can be avoided: doing nothing 
reaffirms the traditional state sanction of heterosexual marriage consistent with the 
promotion of traditional notions of sexual morality, and deregulating marriage in favor of 
civil unions or private ceremonies affirms equality and choice at the expense of the 
traditional family values.100  
 Nozick suggests, consistent with his celebration of liberty, that the solution is not 
to avoid all expression of controversial values, but rather “when someone conscientiously 
objects on moral grounds to the goals of a public policy,” he or she should be allowed to 
opt out of that policy to the extent possible.101  He emphasizes, however, that while some 
even “propose removing anything morally controversial from the political realm, leaving 
it for private endeavor, . . . this would prevent the majority from jointly and publicly 
affirming its values.”102  Instead, he advocates balancing the symbolic expression of the 
majority against the individual’s ability to resist compelled participation.   
 I believe, despite my preference for blue state values, that Nozick is right that the 
state should retain the power to express the values of the majority,103 and that within the 
American family law context that means preserving some space for the expression of 
different values in different states.104  States can choose which values to promote on a 
majoritarian basis, and provide for their symbolic promotion, and active inculcation 
                                                 
100 Though not, as we have argued above, the family values of financial regularity and commitment to 
children.   
101 Id. at 290. (Emphasis in original). 
102 Id. 
103 This argument depends, however, on representation in the expression of values.  It is one thing for a 
legislature representing majoritarian views to promote values that affect all citizens equally.  (Legislative 
efforts to stigmatizing adultery, for example, carry greater moral weight when unfaithful legislators are 
among those affected.)  It is another thing, however, when the majority exercises political power to 
stigmatize behavior primarily associated a minority.  It is arguable, for example, that welfare reform 
involved imposition of the views of a majority (marriage promoting middle class whites) through 
regulation of a program disproportionately affecting a minority (welfare recipients who are 
disproportionately poor people of color) who might embrace different values or priorties.  To that end, 
promotion of the unity of sex, marriage and procreation by a heterosexual majority might be legitimate, but 
prohibition of same-sex (but not different-sex) sodomy clearly would not be.   
104 See Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 Colum. J. Gender & L. 197, 197-99 (1999) ("Under our 
federalist system, the axiom has it, family law resides within the province of the states ... As a factual 
matter, however, the federal government exerts tremendous power over family."). 
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through education and voluntary programs.105  I believe that the limits on state power and 
the preservation of autonomy lie in avoiding where possible a “symbolic affront” in the 
clash of values, and preserving the autonomy of individuals to express different beliefs, 
and participate in private consensual conduct at odds with public norms.106    
 The idea of “symbolic affront” requires explication.  All choices of one set of 
values over another involves a “symbolic affront” to those rejected.  Indeed, state 
inculcation of shared values necessarily involves efforts to undermine opposing views.  
Nonetheless, clashes between values do not always involve polar opposites.  For 
example, those who would affirm women’s equality and autonomy, and maintain that a 
woman’s most important obligation to her children involves deferring childbearing until 
she is able to optimally provide for the children she rears, do not necessarily advocate 
abortion as an unqualified right.  Instead, they see it as instrumental to values they do 
hold.  Where different states vary in the choice of primary values, and both value choices 
are defensible, national decisions and the resolution interstate conflicts should attempt to 
minimize the symbolic affront to values actively promoted in some states, but not 
others.107  In the abortion context, for example, this may mean that public funding, to the 
extent it occurs at all, exists at the state level, where it can be implemented in a way that 
complements the expression of shared values, rather than the federal level.   
 With respect to the expression of individual views and conduct, Nozick provides 
the example of a conscientious objector, who he argues should be permitted to substitute 
taxes for war for contributions of equal or greater value to another government program, 
and his suggestion works in the blue states.  That is, someone who objects to state 
contributions to family planning or abortion services might be given the option of 
redirecting tax dollars.  Indeed, the federal government has largely eliminated federal 
funding for abortion and similar services for reasons akin to those Nozick advances.   
                                                 
105 Individual students or families, however, should have the option of not participating in public education 
to which they object.  The ability not to participate in sex education classes or discussions of controversial 
literature provide an existing example. 
106 This leaves open the question of what behavior, such as polygamy, can still be banned as inconsistent 
with the overlapping consensus or the harm principle discussed above.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body 
Politics: Lawrence V. Texas And The Constitution Of Disgust And Contagion,  57 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1056 
(2005), observing that: 
The original principles undergirding the Fourteenth Amendment plus the admonition against raising 
the stakes of politics can be synthesized into doctrinal variables-features of a liberty- infringing policy 
that render it more or less constitutionally vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. So a morals 
law that criminalizes conduct that (1) is no longer widely criminalized and (2) does not seem to impose 
harm on third parties but (3) is important to a coherent and well-organized social group is most 
constitutionally objectionable. Like consensual sodomy, fornication easily fits within this unregulable 
core: Most states have decriminalized it, there is virtually no evidence of third-party harms, and a 
whole generation (the baby boomers) consider the right to fornicate important to their lives, or 
formative experiences in their youths. 
107 This provides a basis for distinguishing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  By the time the case was 
decided in 1967, the moral basis of the anti-miscegenation statutes, which rested on an ideal of racial 
purity, could be said to be in disrepute whatever the majority response in some state polls might be.  The 
Court accordingly held that the Virginia statute served no legitimate purpose.   The identification of 
marriage with the unity of sex, procreation and childrearing, while under assault, cannot at this point be 
said to be in disrepute.   See discussion infra.   
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 The larger issues, however, involve the autonomy of individuals to order their 
lives, their relationships, and their families.   No state is likely to compel participation in 
marriage, and though the shot gun marriage may still be alive in some parts of the 
country (and still apparently desired in Congress), direct coercion is rare.108  Instead, the 
difficulty arises most from the symbolic affront that occurs from placing the imprimatur 
of the state on – or actively condemning -- controversial relationships.   
 To the extent that opponents of same-sex marriage have a legitimate basis on 
which to invoke the power of the state on a majoritarian basis, it comes from the 
identification of marriage, on a historical, emotional and religious level, with procreation, 
and the dissonance that arises from extending that relationship to non-procreative 
unions.109  Conversely, the strongest claim to state recognition of same-sex marriage 
involves what Justice Scalia has referred to as the “homosexual agenda,” "directed at 
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual 
conduct."110  Affirmation of same-sex marriage involves practical and symbolic 
affirmation of the values of autonomy, equality and fairness.111  It also involves 
recognition of the parenting status of two adults who may have undertaken important 
roles in children’s lives. 
 Those states, therefore, which wish to affirm equality and responsibility to 
children while deregulating sexuality, should encourage the creation of private spaces for 
the expression of traditional values.  The separation of civil and religious marriage 
provides a perfect example.   
 For those states which wish to affirm the continuing limitation of marriage to a 
man and a woman, the answer may be to distinguish the symbolic affirmation of values 
from practical compulsion, and to separate federal recognition of basic rights governing 
conduct from greater state autonomy to express values.   
 The first component in this balance is national protection for private conduct.   
Ariela Dubler argues that Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence represents the ultimate 
dismantling of marriage as the bright line between licit and illicit sex.112  Lawrence 
instead effectively recognizes three categories of intimate behavior: state-sanctioned 
activity within marriage, illicit sex that continues to be criminalized such as prostitution 
or polygamy, and a new category that is neither approved nor condemned.  Kennedy 
                                                 
108 It is sadly more of an issue with respect to parental notification statutes; these issues, however, turn on 
the relationship of parental authority over a minor.  See Sanger, supra. 
109 See, e.g., Chai Feldman’s summary of the arguments, observing that “[d]uring early congressional 
debates on marriage, opponents of marriage equality contended that marriage for same-sex couples would 
result in condoning gay sexual coupling and would thereby radically redefine and irrevocably shatter the 
moral foundations of both marriage and society.  In later congressional debates, opponents shifted their 
argument to the claim that having a "mom and a dad" represented the optimal environment for passing on 
moral and social values to children.”  Chai R. Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage 
Equality and More, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism 139, 141 (2005). 
110Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003). 
111 Feldblum, supra, at 144. 
112 Dubler, supra, at 812. 
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takes pains in Lawrence to recognize the potential value of same-sex bonds, but he 
deliberately stops short of insisting that the state must extend formal recognition to the 
relationships.  In doing so, he creates a protected space for individual behavior while 
minimizing the symbolic affront to majoritarian values.   
 Second, the harm principle should limit the policing of other aspects of traditional 
morality as it relates to children.  Virtually all custody precedents, for example, require a 
nexus between sexual behavior and children’s interests as a consideration in custody 
cases.113   Such cases allow symbolic reinforcement of traditional values without (if 
effectively followed) too great an infringement on private conduct. 
 Third, while interstate recognition of same-sex union may trigger resistance, 
adoptions and property judgments should clearly come under the protection of the full 
faith and credit clause.  These court orders may not necessarily involve state embrace of 
the underlying adult unions; yet, they are of enormous potential significance in the 
private ordering of individual lives.114
 The abortion cases pose greater challenges, in part, because the issue involves not 
just a clash over family values, but deep, religiously based divisions over the definition of 
life.  I believe that at least part of the reason for the enduring clash over abortion is the 
fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe does pose a symbolic affront to deeply held 
values that has not dissipated with the passage of time.  I will leave the definitions of life 
to others, but argue that the approach I have maintained with respect to same-sex 
marriage also holds with respect to abortion in at least two respects. 
 First, parental notification measures involve a symbolic reaffirmation of parental 
authority over sexual conduct.   Protection for vulnerable minors should come through 
safeguards built into implementation of the procedures rather than a direct assault on the 
principle. 
 Second, greater protection should be accorded to interstate travel.  Choice may be 
meaningless without access. 
 Finally, as noted above, the ability of individuals to opt out, or express 
disapproval should be respected.  As a practical matter, this involves a balance between 
                                                 
113 See Harris, Teitelbaum and Carbone, Family Law 666 (2005). 
114 The traditional rule that states must recognize out of state marriages unless the marriages offend the 
basic public policy of the states, in contrast with the full faith and credit laws, does not require deference to 
the different values of different jurisdictions.  Instead, the home state is free to choose to affirm its values at 
the expense of a sister state’s.  Because of this legal frame, the symbolic meaning of recognition of an out 
of state marriage is greater than the symbolic meaning of an out of state adoption or property judgment.  
See June Carbone, (work in progress). 
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securing access to abortion and family planning services and allowing individual 
providers of medical services not to participate in actions they find objectionable.115
Conclusion 
 Both Kennedy’s Lawrence majority opinion and Scalia’s dissent recognized that 
the expression of values reflects evolving, rather than static norms.   They disagreed on 
the respective roles of the legislature and the courts in recognizing changes over time.  
The argument in this paper suggests that the evolution also reflects, not just geographic 
divisions, but differing responses to class, gender and economic shifts that may play out 
at different times and with different consequences in various parts of the country.   In the 
face of such fundamental differences, choosing one set of values over another may 
simply deepen a polarization that encourages not just the rejection, but the disrespect of 
opposing views and those who hold them.  This paper has argued that a liberal democracy 
ought to be able to promote controversial values, but it should do so in ways that 
minimize “the symbolic affront” to minority perspectives and preserve the individual 
autonomy of expression and conduct that leaves room for institutional evolution. 
 In the meantime, this solution insists on recognition of differing roles for 
legislatures and those courts that would impose uniform national results as a matter of 
constitutional right.  The articulation of majoritarian values can be an appropriate role for 
the legislature even in the face of a vigorous dissent.   The courts, in contrast, should 
protect individual autonomy in the expression of beliefs, participation in symbolic 
activities, and private conduct .  Bill Eskridge, who has strongly advocated recognition of 
same-sex marriage in other contexts, maintains that:  
The politics of tolerance strongly counsels that the Court do nothing for the time 
being. Either rejecting or endorsing the constitutionality of same-sex marriage 
bars would immediately raise the stakes of national politics. The reason is that the 
issue of same-sex marriage not only remains divisive, but also divides in ways 
that cut to the core of people's identities. Under these circumstances, the Court's 
best strategy is to leave the matter to the states, the famous "laboratories for 
experimentation."116
 It is important to emphasize that allowing room for state promotion of 
controversial values holds only so long as the expression of values represents defensible 
values important to legitimate state interests, and the states, through the legislature or the 
courts, protect what might otherwise be unpopular groups from oppression.  At the point 
where it can no longer be said that any legitimate state interest is served, or where 
majoritarian values have so shifted to undermine the basis for the values expressed, the 
balance between symbolic expression and individual autonomy may change.  Thus, 
                                                 
115 This clearly means that an individual doctor should not be compelled to perform an abortion.  It does not 
mean, however, that the state may not guarantee access to abortion services by requiring that all doctors  
employed in certain clinics be willing to provide abortion services as a condition of employment.   
116 Eskridge, supra, at 1057-58. 
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Loving v. Virginia,117 which in many ways involved the same type of clash between a 
traditional vision of the role of marriage and a claim of equal rights for an oppressed 
majority, avoided the type of symbolic affront described here because the anti-
miscegenation principle enshrined in the challenged statute had lost its legitimacy.  While 
in some parts of the country the case against same-sex marriage is equally tenuous, in 
other places the continuing celebration of the unity of marriage, sex and procreation 
retains enough integrity to counsel deference to majoritarian expression.  Autonomy in 





                                                 
117 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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